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Social Rationality as a Unified Model of Man
(Including Bounded Rationality)
SIEGWART LINDENBERG
ICS/Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, NL-9712 TC
Groningen (E-mail: s.m.lindenberg@ppsw.rug.n1)
Introduction
In 1957, Simon published a collection of his essays under the title of “Models of
Man: Social and Rational”. In the preface, he explains the choice for this title:
All of the essays “are concerned with laying foundations for a science of man
that will comfortably accommodate his dual nature as a social and as a rational
animal.” (p. vii) Observe that the title of the book refers to two models of man,
one social and one rational. Throughout his life, Simon kept contributing to this
science of man. The most well-known contributions directly relate to this duality.
In a nutshell, his most outspoken propositions in this context were the following.
Socially, man is docile; that is, most of his or her beliefs “are acquired, not by inde-
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pendent verification of the facts in the real world, but from social sources regarded
as legitimate.” (Simon, 1997, p. 202). With regard to rationality, Simon relaxed
three central assumptions of SEU (subjectively expected utility) theory on empir-
ical grounds. His three counter propositions are interrelated. First, alternatives are
generally not fixed in advance but generated (or identified), and the process of
generation or identification is not in any way comparable to an optimal search but
rather a heuristic search, because the number of possibilities and combinations is
so large that search costs are not known in advance. Second, we should not assume
that probability distributions of outcomes are known. Instead, we should assume
that people develop strategies for dealing with uncertainty that do not assume
knowledge of probabilities. This is not just a matter of lacking specific informa-
tion. It is also a limit of our scientific theories with regard to the prediction of
phenomena relevant for choice. Third, we should not assume utility maximization
but satisficing. The heuristic search for alternatives ends when a certain criterion
is reached (stop rule) and the consequences of the found alternative(s) are esti-
mated by simple heuristic strategies. Simon called these three propositions jointly
bounded rationality in order to distinguish them from conceptions of unbounded
rationality (such as SEU theory).
Viewed from another angle, the same propositions can also be contrasted
with yet another aspect of standard SEU theory. Simon argued that “rational,”
as it is conceived in microeconomics and SEU theory, is a term attributable to
substantive outcomes of a decision. By contrast, the term may be applied not to
substantive outcomes but to the process from which decisions have evolved. In this
sense, Simon’s three rationality propositions also indicate procedural rationality
(as opposed to substantive rationality). This distinction may create an unneces-
sary discontinuity between microeconomics and SEU theory on the one hand, and
bounded rationality on the other. By this distinction, Simon may have made it
difficult for himself and others to see the common core of both conceptions and to
see that microeconomics and SEU are also linked to decision-making procedures,
albeit procedures that are both very rudimentary and almost immune to subjective
input. It might be better to interpret the distinction as one of emphasis. What Simon
calls “procedural rationality” is a conception that puts much more emphasis on
detail and on subjective input than the conception of “substantive rationality”. As
we will see below, when we explicate the common core and interpret the difference
between unbounded and bounded rationality as different specifications of this core,
rationality is always procedural.
With both his contributions about the social and the rational side of man, Simon
uncontestedly made a great contribution to the development of the social sciences.
He applied both to a great number of important questions, and many authors
used his suggestions, especially the one’s on bounded rationality. In organiza-
tion studies, the use of some version of bounded rationality led to considerable
advance.1 However, even if one is very sympathetic to Simon’s suggestions, there
are also important limitations and Simon himself observed that his ideas did not
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have the impact they were intended to have.2 For my purposes, I would like to
focus on two such limitations.
First, Simon never came to a satisfactory integration of his two models of
man. Because of this, many of his suggestions failed to have the impact they
deserved. For example, for a long time, Simon had insisted on the importance
of selective attention. Problems of lack of information are legitimate problems
and have become prominent in agency theories, the New Institutional Economics
and in theories of contracting. Yet, at all times, there are also problems of too
much information, Simon would insist. “Human beings handle this difficulty by
attending to only a small part of the complexity around them. They make in highly
simplified model of the world, and they make their decisions in terms of that model
and the subset of variables that enter into it” (Simon, 1997, p. 357). This insight
was repeated time and again in Simon’s work, yet it was never really worked out in
more detail by him, nor was it really integrated into his theories on docility and/or
satisficing. Similarly, Simon insisted on an important role for emotions and social
processes in directing attention (Simon, 1983, p. 17ff, 1997, pp. 363, 3683). Again,
these insights were not worked into his models of man in any systematic way, say,
in terms of the influence of goals on selective attention. Maybe as a result of this,
“social man” (who does not just learn socially-mediated knowledge, but for Simon
also acts on the basis of learned conventions) and “rational man” (who pursues
goals [which goals?] within the limits of his or her bounded rationality) remain
separate theories of action.
A second limitation is Simon’s selective attention to problems of simplifica-
tion. He understands full well that human beings must use simplifications in their
strategies to deal with complexity. He applies this insight with force to simula-
tion and macroeconomic models (Simon, 1997, p. 105ff). For such models, he
claims, we should not try to model complex mechanisms if we do not under-
stand them well. Instead, we should use highly simplified approximations. For
example, the lessons of the highly-complex World Dynamics Models of Meadows
et al. could have easily been demonstrated “with the aid of much smaller models
that are analytically tractible [sic!]” (ibid., p. 112). However, when it comes to
microeconomic models, analytical tractability does not seem to him to be worth
making strong simplifications, even in situations where they “work”. Presumably,
the highly simplified assumptions lead us to assume the wrong mechanisms behind
the results. Be that as it may, when it comes to behavioral models, Simon did
not explicitly deal with the trade-off between analytical tractability and realistic
assumptions. There is something to say in favor of simplified assumptions, not just
something in favor of realism. For ages, economists have used (to some degree)
the method of decreasing abstraction4 in order to combine the advantages of tract-
ability with those of greater realism. This method urges one to begin as simply as
possible and only to introduce more complex assumptions when they are deemed
absolutely necessary. Strong simplification can later be relaxed in favor of weaker
simplifications (i.e. assumptions that abstract less from reality). The reason this
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method is only used by economists in a half-hearted way cannot be attributed to
the method per se, it seems to me. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the
tools for a forceful application of this method have never been well developed
by economists. These tools consist minimally of (a) a core theory of rationality
(such as RREEMM, see below) and (b) a menu of assumptions and theories,
which increase in realism. These assumptions and theories can successively be
plugged into the core theory as specifications of its various parts. By having two
models of man, Simon did not have a core theory and so he could not possibly use
the method of decreasing abstraction. Also, the distinction between “substantive”
and “procedural” rationality stood in the way of using this method. By contrast,
microeconomists did have such a core. However, so far, they have used only a very
small menu of increasingly realistic assumptions, covering only restrictions and
expectations (say, going from the assumption of no transaction costs to one with
transaction costs, or from the assumption of complete information to one of incom-
plete information, etc.). Rarely, if ever, have they allowed more complex theories
with regard to aspiration (maximization) and with regard to selective attention (i.e.
of framing the action situation), the two areas where Simon’s work would have
been most relevant. The reason for this, it seems to me, is that the simplifications
in microeconomics have been governed by what was necessary to give a clear
meaning to “utility maximization”. Maximization is seen as the heart of ration-
ality. The simplification of all other assumptions is to be considered auxiliary to
maximization (including assumptions on expectations, restrictions, ordered prefer-
ences, structured choice-set, etc.) These other assumptions may increase realism,
but if they begin to muddy the clear and tractable meaning of maximization, they
may not enter into the method of decreasing abstraction. The rationale behind it
is that by giving maximization such a prominent place, the theory may be less
realistic but it will be strong on tractability and the scope of application.
Had Simon been working with a core theory of rationality (one that included
social man), he might have at least treated simplification in behavioral theories
in the same way he treated it in other models: from both sides, tractability and
realism. Attacking maximization might have taken another turn in his work. As it
is, he approached the problem in terms of the realism of this assumption, leaving
out the tractability issue. If he thought at all of simplification in this context, he
thought of it in terms of the requirements imposed on the human decision-maker,
not the modeling process. For example, satisficing is a way “of simplifying the
choice problem to bring it within the powers of human computation” (Simon, 1957,
p. 204). He does mention at times that the SEU model would be applicable under
certain simple circumstances, but he does not pursue the issue and thus never comes
to the point where he would say: For the sake of tractability, when we deal with
problems of the class X, it is perfectly alright to assume perfect information or
even optimization. Under condition of class Y, we need to give up some advantages
of tractability in favor of realism, relax the assumption of perfect information and
replace it with assumptions on subjective risk estimates. Under yet other conditions
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of class Z, we have to go even a step further and introduce assumptions on heuristic
search. Williamson has put it thus: “Rather than encourage economizing reasoning,
to which economists could easily relate and usefully contribute, bounded ration-
ality became identified with aspiration level mechanisms instead. . . . It is now
generally agreed that the satisficing approach has not been broadly applicable”
(Williamson, 1995, p. 179).
1. Procedural Rationality as a Basis for Unifying the Model of Man
What are the features of human behavior that make up human rationality? Gener-
ally, the more or less intelligent pursuit of goals under the consideration of
constraints captures the heart of what is considered to be human rationality. Calcu-
lation itself is no necessary part of what is meant by “intelligent pursuit” (see
Grandori, 2001). As Simon puts it: “the decision-maker wishes to attain goals
and uses his or her mind as well as possible to that end” (1997, p. 293). The
disadvantage of putting it this way, is that in such a formulation the picture is
not fine-grained enough to accommodate different specifications of this general
consensus. It is therefore useful to split this into a number of components. First of
all, the goals that are being pursued should be split into substantive and operational
goals. “Operational,” according to the dictionary, refers to “being in action” and
“the way in which something works”. For example, the assumption of self-interest
is an assumption about certain goals human beings pursue (a matter of their eval-
uations), whereas “maximization” is an assumption about the process of choosing
alternatives that pertain to these goals (a matter of aspiration or, more generally,
motivation). The maximization assumption states that human beings want their
goals realized in such a way that in every situation, the best alternative is chosen.
The term “operational” refers, in this context, to the dynamic side of preferences
(or substantive goals). Second, it is useful to split what is meant by “more or less
intelligent pursuit” of goals. To begin with, there is the assumption that individuals
are resourceful in their goal-pursuit. They are inventive; i.e. they can think of new
ways of achieving a goal and can adapt to changing environments. Human beings
also form expectations about past, present and future events and are able to learn
from experience or example, or instruction. In addition, human begins are able to
structure (i.e. define) situations in such a way that elements relevant to the pursuit
of certain goals become salient. In other words, situations are made meaningful
in terms of goal-pursuit. Third, it is useful to bring in scarcity explicitly: human
beings are restricted in their resources and they pursue their goals under the consid-
eration of these restrictions. Jointly, these elements make up human rationality. A
handy way to remember these elements is to fit them into an acronym: RREEMM.5
A human being, irrespective of time and place, is endowed with rationality, which
means that he/she is. . . .
Resourceful (meaning: inventive, creative, problem solving): a human being
will search for and often find possibilities to realize a state he/she evaluates
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more positively than the one he/she is in; he/she can be inventive and adapt to
changing environments.
Restricted: a human being is confronted with scarcity and chooses (consciously
or not) among exclusive options; choice implies costs in terms of forgone
opportunities.
Expecting: a human being forms expectations about past, present and future
events and adjusts these expectations by learning from experience, example or
instruction.
Evaluating: a human being attaches value to past, present and future states of
the world; this leads to the formation of preferences (i.e. substantive goals).
Motivated: a human being is motivated to achieve a higher level for those
conditions for which he or she has ordered preferences. This can be seen as an
operational goal that expresses a general striving across different situational-
goals. It implies possible substitution of one option for another when restric-
tions, expectations and/or evaluations change.
Meaning: a human being, when confronted with an unstructured situation,
will try to improve the structure of this situation by making it meaningful in
terms of the other elements of RREEMM. For example, when he/she experi-
ences an unexpected event, he/she will try to fit the event into the knowledge
that generates his/her expectations or else search for appropriate changes in
the knowledge, i.e. he/she will search for reasons for the occurrence of the
unexpected event.
As it stands, RREEMM needs to be filled with more specific assumption in
order to become a model of man. For example, we can fill in RREEMM in such a
way that we generate homo oeconomicus of microeconomics and also the theory
of rational egoists (SEU theory):
Resourceful: for both homo oeconomicus and the theory of rational egoists,
individuals are assumed to think of efficient solutions to their problems (this
includes, in some versions, even actively changing the given set of alternatives)
and to learn efficiently from experience (see Expectations).
Restricted: for homo oeconomicus, it is assumed that one’s own income (in
terms of money) and scarcity of consumer goods (reflected in monetary prices)
jointly form the relevant restriction. In some versions, time and effort are
explicitly admitted as restrictions (yet their price is to be expressed in terms
of money, as “shallow prices”). For the theory of rational egoists, restrictions
consist of a given set of behavioral alternatives with associated outcomes and
rules. The set is generally selected by the researcher to represent a particular
choice-situation (say, “vote or not vote”).
Expecting: for homo oeconomicus, expectations are trivial due to the assump-
tion of complete information on alternatives and prices, or due (in case
uncertainty is assumed) to the assumption that expectations are correct in the
aggregate (so-called “rational expectations”). The theory of rational egoists
admits risk and asymmetric information explicitly. Yet, individuals are assumed
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to estimate objective probabilities and to do so, by and large, correctly, given
the evidence available to them, at prices they are willing to pay for this
evidence. Since individuals in both theories are assumed to look into the future
and (in the aggregate) anticipate the relevant contingencies fairly objectively
(i.e. they are assumed to be “farsighted”), time has no influence on the way in
which expectations are formed.
Evaluating: for homo oeconomicus, preferences are pragmatically restricted to
(material) consumer goods, assumed to be ordered and governed by subjective
rates of substitution between goods (which, in turn, are governed by decreasing
marginal value). “Utility” is not a measure of subjective well-being but the
evaluation of goods relative to each other (i.e. the substitution value measured
by the slope of the indifference-curve). The actual preference ordering is
exogenous to the theory and filled-in through the assumption that these order-
ings are revealed through action. In principle, there are no apriori restrictions
on what might he revealed. In the theory of rational egoists, it is assumed that
people have ordered preferences on goods that serve self-interest, governed by
subjective rates of substitution between goods (which, in turn, are governed by
decreasing marginal utility). Evaluations are assumed not to be relative (with
ordinal preferences) but absolute, so that expectations can influence evaluations
in a systematic way (expected utility formed by weighting the utility of a good
with the subjective probability of its occurrence).
Motivated: for homo oeconomicus, the operational goal of individuals is to
maximize their utility and to do so simply by ranking the available options
according to the ordered preferences and choosing according to this ranking.
Technically, this is sometimes expressed in terms of ratios: individuals will, for
any pair of goods, choose quantities such that the ratio of marginal utilities of
these goods is equal to their relative prices (i.e. to the ratio of prices of these
goods). For the theory of rational egoists, the operational goal of individuals
is to maximize their expected utility across outcomes (which also presup-
poses ordered preferences and certain consistency requirements: so-called Von
Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions, see Harsanyi, 1977).
Meaning: for both theories, “meaning” does not have to be explicitly dealt with,
because, by assumption, actors are at all times confronted with well-structured
(i.e. meaningful) situations. Thus, both theories are not incompatible with prob-
lems of meaning (i.e. of the definition of the situation), but these problems
fall outside the intended range of these theories. Questions about the sources
of clearly structured choice-situations in real life thereby also fall outside the
range. For example, to the degree that well-structured choice-situations indeed
govern many market transactions, there is no way one can then ask questions –
within the theory – about how they come about, say, by institutional influences
on framing or by interaction (see White, 1993).
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2. Social Rationality
There are many other ways in which RREEMM can be specified into a full-
blown model of man. One that would be close to Simon’s suggestions and yet also
integrate the social and rational side of human beings is what I call “social ration-
ality”. Particularly, the introduction of an evolutionary perspective has encouraged
an integration of these two aspects because it sees the development of “adaptive
rationality” as governed by reproductive success, which, for humans, means a
social success in generally uncertain environments. Rationality itself can be seen
as pertaining both to social tendencies (such as having particular goals, assigning
meaning to situations) and to dealing with uncertainty and restrictions (such as
heuristics). Conversely, social influences can be seen in the way individuals deal
with uncertainty and restrictions. The social and rational sides of human beings
are thoroughly intertwined. Therefore, it is useful to speak of “social rationality”
in terms of a unified model of man. Its specification in terms of RREEMM could
look like this:
Resourceful: Even though this list begins with resourcefulness, we need to
first anticipate the specification of the operational goal (under “motivated”)
in order to obtain a good understanding of the importance of resourcefulness.
To maximize or optimize within given constraints needs no specific attention
to resourcefulness. The frontiers of possibilities are given and maximization
remains within them. However, below, the operational goal will be identified
as, “to improve one’s condition”. This goal gives resourcefulness a central role
in the conception of rationality, including learning in the sense of an active
improvement of one’s knowledge. For Simon, “the greater part of the decision-
maker’s time and effort is devoted to generating or identifying alternatives.”
(1997, p. 321) The social side of this is that reference points for improvement
are socially induced in most cases, via social standards, normative reference
groups, and social comparison processes. Simon had pointed to the fact that
learning is mainly “social learning” (Simon, 1997, p. 209). Limitations with
regard to resourcefulness that stem from framing effects will be discussed in
more detail under “meaning”.
Restricted: In the light of an improvement goal and resourcefulness, restric-
tions take on a meaning quite different from the one in neoclassical economics
and SEU theory. Rather than point to the feasible set of consumer goods or
discrete alternatives, the theory of social rationality draws attention to possi-
bilities of improvement by changing the seemingly given restrictions. Simon
would say that a heuristic search will generate alternatives. Resourcefulness is
required because in most cases, the expected marginal return from an “optimal
search” cannot be known in advance. The social side consists of the fact that
most restrictions are socially produced (such as money, social and cultural
capital) and socially conditioned (such as time, energy). Some restrictions
(for example, the involuntary display of emotions) may be rational from an
evolutionary point of view.
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Expecting: Human beings are forward-looking but not farsighted. A good
term to describe their powers of anticipation is “savvyness”. On this point,
too, Simon’s influence has been great. He stressed that individual’s expecta-
tions are not generally governed by rational Baysian updates (in the sense
of “rational expectations” in economics), that expectations of an individual
are strongly influenced by the expectations of others through processes that
influence the focus of attention (emotions, social processes). The heuristics
individuals use to generate expectations are adapted to the structure of the
environment. The research into heuristics used by individuals to generate
expectations have recently taken a strong social turn along the lines suggested
by Simon. For example, Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) study “fast and frugal”
heuristics with simple stopping-rules. A striking feature of these heuristics is
that using only a subset of the available information will often lead to more
realistic expectations. One can assume that people recognize the social nature
of the generation of expectations and figure this into their interaction. With
regard to contracting, this insight led Favereau (1997) to argue that “the incom-
pleteness of contracts is not the problem but (its acceptance is) the solution.”
The generation of expectations is often also socially orchestrated through joint
categories and institutionalized rules (see Stinchcombe, 1986), creating “co-
orientation” (Scheff, 1967). This means that the expectations are locked-in by
the fact that they mesh. For example, the rule to drive on the right side of the
road creates expectations about the other’s behavior, but also about the other’s
knowledge of the rule and about the other’s expectations concerning me.
Evaluating: In the neo-classical consumer theory, human goals are not theoret-
ically specified and only pragmatically restricted to material consumer goods.
Clearly, this is a very unsatisfactory solution for the analysis of social contexts
and interaction. In the theory of rational egoists, human goals are specified
by the vague concept of” self-interest”, by many taken to mean “material
gain”. Yet, in most real-life contexts, it is not so evident what “self-interest”
is, since the concept covers very heterogeneous goals and empirically defies
the assumption of ordered preferences. Simon has treated this aspect in his
discussions on satisficing and on altruism (for example, Simon, 1997, pp. 197ff
and 295ff). Yet, even though he introduced evolutionary arguments in this
context, he did not go more deeply into an analysis of human goals to solve
some of the puzzles surrounding the concept of self-interest. In this way, both
his conception of self-interest and of “altruism” remain vague. “Self-interest”
is left unanalyzed and “altruism” refers, at times, to processes of identification
with the group or the organization, and at times to the ignorance about one’s
own sacrifice that is socially extracted. Another general problem in dealing
with human goals is that no clear distinction is made between operational goals
(such as maximization or improvement) and substantive goals (such as phys-
ical and social well-being). I will turn to operational goals under the heading
of “motivated”. Here, the question is what substantive goals are there, if any,
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that can be assumed to be universal? There is no room to go into much detail
about the answer I could give to these questions (see Lindenberg ad Frey, 1993;
Lindenberg, 2001). Suffice it to say that in my view, a theory of goals as part of
a theory of social rationality would have to put two universal goals at the top of
the hierarchy: physical well-being and social well-being. Physical well-being
covers mainly comfort (to be free of pain, hunger, etc.) and stimulation (to
maintain a certain level of activation). Thus, contrary to a standard assumption
in economics, effort (reduction in comfort) is not always a net cost if it helps
achieve an improvement in terms of stimulation. The other major goal has been
stressed over and over again by sociologists as the most important universal
goal: social well-being, produced by some form of social approval. The direct
instruments for doing so also have a long pedigree within sociology and are
also corroborated by evolutionary arguments: Status, behavioral confirmation,
and affection. The study of the interaction of the realization of these two blocks
of goals reveals that the openness to social influence makes evolutionary sense6
in the context of individual goal-pursuit that is sensitive to cost. In this sense,
the social and the rational sides are solidly intertwined, also on this point.
This point is reinforced by the hierarchical structure of means-end relations
(or “social production functions”). There are many layers of instruments that
can be used to achieve higher-level goals. Some resources (such as money or
“having a partner”) are even multifunctional and can be used to reach a number
of higher-level goals. Simon also realized this hierarchical nature of goals.
For him, the ability to reason about conduct stems from this very structure,
because “most of the ought’s we profess are not ultimate standards of conduct
but only subgoals, adopted as means to other goals” (Simon, 1983). From
such a hierarchy, it also follows that preferences in the future are uncertain
(as uncertain as any contingent relations) and will be subject to people’s own
efforts in influencing them. March (1978) has made this point very clear. He has
also pointed out how different this conception is from the neoclassical view of
stable preferences.
Motivated: A strong candidate for an operational goal that is compatible with
bounded rationality and the impact of social standards on behavior is the
general desire to improve one’s condition. It implies that relative gain is more
important than absolute gain and that reference points and social comparisons
are therefore crucial for the utility an individual derives from goal achieve-
ment. Thus, improvement may also be the prevention of deterioration of the
present condition, or limiting the loss that would materialize if you did nothing.
The goal to improve one’s condition has been recognized as a major opera-
tional goal by classical authors (Adam Smith, Emile Durkheim). More recent
contributions have moved in the same direction, arguing for relative, rather
than absolute, conceptions of utility (for example, Scitovsky, 1976; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Frank, 1992). I would like to argue that satisficing can be
seen as a specific version of the operational goal “to improve one’s condition”.
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Simon often refers to the link between satisficing and improvement, especially
by bringing in the mechanism of adaptive aspiration levels (see Simon, 1997,
p. 323). It remains to be seen whether satisficing or some other version of this
operational goal proves to be the most useful conception. In any case, it is
already clear, that to assume an improvement goal instead of a maximization
goal has large consequences for virtually all other elements of RREEMM.
Meaning: Individuals must make sense of situations, before they can act.
They must “define” situations. In certain situations, the structure is so simple,
obvious and unambiguous that we can neglect this very process. However, in
many, if not most cases in the social world, situations are not well-structured,
they can be “framed” in multiple ways and we must know how they will
be framed. This is Simon’s point about selective attention. The way he has
worked out this insight, as stated above, is linked to influences on attention. He
mentions emotions but also information and communication flows in society.
One might also add institutional prescriptions concerning appropriate frames.
Of all the elements of RREEMM, processes of selective-attention are likely
to be the most important links for the integration of the social and rational
side of human beings, and therefore need to be worked out in much more
detail. Frames do not just govern what we attend to, but also what bits of
knowledge and beliefs become more easily accessible in memory, and what
criteria we will use for the selection and ordering of alternatives. Aspects that
fall outside the frame are thereby not gone, but will influence the effectiveness
of the frame. Here, the distinction between automatic and controlled processes
is important. Again, there is no room for detail in this short paper, but a lot has
already been done in this direction, in addition to the work by Kahneman and
Tversky (see Lindenberg, 1993, 2001). An important point is that the selec-
tion of frames seems to be mediated by goals, so that emotional and societal
influences on frames work via their influence on goals. If this is true, then
it become even more important to have a theory of substantive goals, and it
makes even more difference whether the operational goal assumed is maximiz-
ation or ‘improving one’s condition’. An important point connected to framing
effects is the preponderance of short-term aspects above long-term aspects, or
myopia (see Loewestein and Elster, 1992). Simon did not go into this problem
much, but it is clear that the way incentives work is heavily influenced by the
question whether they are short-term or long-term. For models of governance
in organization, this distinction may be so important that it is likely to frustrate
all efforts to construct valid models of governance that ignore it.
Conclusion
Simon’s seminal work and his many important insights on the social and rational
side of human being can be brought into better relief when the two models of man
(social and rational) are actually integrated into one unified model of man, of which
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bounded rationality is a part. The obvious name for such a unified model is “social
rationality”. By carefully isolating the most relevant elements of any model of man
linked to a notion of rationality (RREEMM), one can present the model in such a
way that its relation to the neoclassical model and to the theory of rational egoists
becomes more transparent. The various theories of rational choice can thus be seen
as different specifications of a common core.
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Notes
1 Particularly, the earlier work of Williamson made great strides using of bounded rationality. In
his later works, an increasing emphasis on the powers of farsightedness has virtually replaced the
consideration of bounded rationality, even though the terms have been retained (see Lindenberg,
1998).
2 Simon, 1997, p. 269. Wherever possible, for the ease of locating his work, I will refer to the 1957
and 1997 collections of papers relevant to our topic rather than to the original publications.
3 The role of emotions as attentional markers has recently been researched by Damasio (1995).
4 See Lindenberg, 1992.
5 See Lindenberg, 1990, where I follow and expand a suggestion by Meckling, 1976. Here I replace
“maximizing” with “motivated” because ‘maximizing’ is seemingly too much identified with its
specific operationalization in microeconomics. I also add “meaning” (the last M0 to the set rather
than to keep it a separate assumption. The reason for this is that I believe that between 1990 and
now this assumption on meaning (the definition of the situation) has become widespread enough to
include it in the consensual set, even though many rational-choice scholars make no explicit use of
it.
6 Within the environment of evolutionary adaptation, inclusive fitness is likely to have been essen-
tially served by (a) resource-holding potential (leading to status-striving, see Gilbert, 1990), (b)
reciprocal altruism (leading to a striving for behavioral confirmation from relevant others, see
Cosmides and Tooby, 1992), and (c) kin altruism (leading to a striving for affection from people
to whom one is closely tied, see Daly, Salmon, and Wilson, 1997). Gilbert (1990) argues, very much
in line with a Simonian argument, that human beings have also developed social attention-holding
potential.
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